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ARTICLES
LAW, JUSTICE AND DISOBEDIENCE
HOWARD ZINN*
In the year 1978, I was teaching a class called "Law and
Justice in America," and on the first day of class I handed out
the course outlines. At the end of the hour one of the students
came up to the desk. He was a little older than the others. He
said: "I notice in your course outline you will be discussing the
case of U.S. vs. O'Brien. When we come to that I would like to
say something about it."
I was a bit surprised, but glad that a student would take
such initiative. I said, "Sure. What's your name?"
He said: "O'Brien. David O'Brien."
It was, indeed, his case. It began the morning of March 31,
1966. American troops were pouring into Vietnam, and U.S.
planes were bombing day and night. David O'Brien, with three
friends, mounted the steps of the Courthouse in South Boston,
where they lived-a mostly Irish, working-class neighbor-
hood-held up their draft registration cards before a crowd
which had assembled, and set the cards afire.
According to Chief Justice Earl Warren, who rendered the
Supreme Court decision in the case: "Immediately after the
burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien" and
he was ushered to safety by an FBI agent. According to
O'Brien, as he told the story to my class, FBI agents pulled him
into the courthouse, threw him into a closet and gave him a few
blows as they arrested him.
Chief Justice Warren's decision said that "O'Brien stated
to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate
because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal
law."' His intention was clear. He wanted to express to the
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community his strong feelings about the war in Vietnam, trying
to call attention, by a dramatic act, to the mass killing our gov-
ernment'was engaged in there. The burning of his draft card
would get special attention precisely because it was against the
law, and so he would risk imprisonment to make his statement.
O'Brien claimed in court that his act, though in violation of
the draft law, was protected by the free speech provision of the
Constitution. But the Supreme Court decided that the govern-
ment's need to regulate the draft overcame his right to free
expression, and he went to prison.2
O'Brien had engaged in an act of civil disobedience-the
deliberate violation of a law for a social purpose.' To violate a
law for individual gain, for a private purpose, is an ordinary
criminal act; it is not civil disobedience. Some acts fall in both
categories, as in the case of a mother stealing bread to feed her
children, or neighbors stopping the eviction of a family which
hasn't been able to pay its rent. They seem limited to one fam-
ily's need, but they carry a larger message to the society about
its failures.
In either instance, the law is being disobeyed, which sets
up powerful emotional currents in a population which has been
taught obedience from childhood.
OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE
"Obey the law." That is a powerful teaching, often power-
ful enough to overcome deep feelings of right and wrong, even
to override the fundamental instinct for personal survival.
Thus World War II veteran, Alvin Bridges, after saying "It was
a useless war, as every war is," can also say in the same conver-
sation, "I'm not an anti-war guy. I'd go tomorrow if there were
a war."
4
We clearly learn very early (we certainly don't get it in our
genes) that we must obey "the law of the land." Tommy Tran-
tino, a poet and artist, sitting on death row in Trenton State
Prison, wrote in his book, Lock the Lock, a short piece called
"The Lore of the Lamb":
i was in prison long ago and it was the first grade and i
have to take a shit and.., the law says you must first raise
you hand and ask the teacher for permission so i obeyer
of the lore of the lamb am therefore busy raising my hand
2. Id.
3. Some of the material in this chapter is drawn from my book H. ZINN,
DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY (1968).
4. S. TERKEL, THE GOOD WAR 387 (1984).
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to the fuhrer who says yes thomas what is it? and i thomas
say I have to take a i mean may i go to the bathroom
please? didn't you go to the bathroom yesterday thomas
she says and I.say yes ma'am mrs parsley sir but i have to
go again today but she says NO .. .and i say eh .. .I
GOTTA TAKE A SHIT DAMMIT and again she says NO
but I go anyway except that it was not out but in my pants
that is to say right in my corduroy knickers goddamm...
i was about six years old at the time and yet i guess
that even then i knew without cerebration that if one
obeys and follows orders and adheres to all the rules and
regulations of the lore of the lamb one is going to shit in
one's pants and one's mother is going to have to clean up
afterwards ya see?5
Surely not all rules and regulations are wrong. One must
have complicated feelings about the obligation to obey the law.
Obeying the law when it sends you to "stupid" wars (veteran
Alvin Bridges' word) seems wrong. Obeying the law against
murder seems absolutely right. Indeed, in order to really obey
that law, one must refuse to obey the law sending you to war.
But the dominant orthodoxy leaves no room for making
intelligent and humane distinctions about the obligations to
obey the law. It is stern and absolute. It is the unbending rule
of every government, whether Fascist, or Communist, or liberal
capitalist. Gertrude Scholtz-Klink, chief of the Women's
Bureau under Hitler, explained to an interviewer the Jewish
policy of the Nazis: "We always obeyed the law. Isn't that what
you do in America? Even if you don't agree with a law person-
ally, you still obey it. Otherwise life would be chaos." 6
"Life would be chaos." If we allow disobedience to law we
will have anarchy. That idea is inculcated in every population
in every country. The phrase which represents it is "law and
order." It is a phrase which sends police and the military to
break up demonstrations everywhere, whether in Moscow, or
Chicago. It was behind the killing of four students at Kent
State University in 1970 by National Guardsmen. It was the
reason given by Chinese authorities in 1989 when they killed
hundreds of demonstrating students in Beijing.
It is a phrase which has appeal for most citizens, who,
unless they themselves have a powerful grievance against
authority, are afraid of disorder. In the 1960s a student at
5. T. TRANTINO, LOCK THE LOCK, 6-8 (1974).
6. C. KoONZ, MOTHERS IN THE FATHERLAND Xxviii (1987).
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Harvard Law School addressed parents and alumni with these
words:
The streets of our country are in turmoil. The uni-
versities are filled with students rebelling and rioting.
Communists are seeking to destroy our country. Russia
is threatening us with her might. And the republic is in
danger. Yes! danger from within and without. We need
law and order! Without law and order our nation cannot
survive.
There was prolonged applause. When the applause died
down, the student quietly told his listeners: "These words
were spoken in 1932 by Adolph Hitler."7
The episode is unsettling. Because in truth, peace, stabil-
ity, and order are desirable. Chaos and violence are not.
But stability and order are not the only desirable condi-
tions of social life. There is also justice, meaning the fair treat-
ment of all human beings, the equal right of all people to
freedom and prosperity. Absolute obedience to law may bring
order, but it may not bringjustice. And when it does not, those
treated unjustly may protest, may rebel, may cause disorder, as
the American revolutionaries did in the 18th century, as anti-
slavery people did in the 19th century, as Chinese students did
in this century, as working people going on strike have done in
every country across the centuries.
Are we not more obligated to achieve justice than to obey
the law? True, the law may serve justice, as when it forbids
rape and murder, or requires a school to admit all students
regardless of race or nationality. But when it sends young men
to war, when it protects the rich and punishes the poor, then
law and justice are opposed to one another. And in that case,
where is our greater obligation, to law, or to justice?'
The answer is given in democratic theory at its best, the
words of Jefferson and his colleagues in the Declaration of
Independence. Law is only a means. Government is only a
means. Justice and equality, specifically, "Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness"9 - these are the ends. And, "whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it
7. N. ZAROULIS & G. SULLIVAN, WHO SPOKE Up? AMERICAN PROTEST
AGAINST THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1963-1975, 241 (1984) (QUOTING EiCHEL,
JOST, LUSKIN, & NEUSTADT, THE HARVARD STRIKE (1970)).
8. Some of the material in this article is drawn from my essay The
Conspiracy of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW (R.P. Wolff ed. 1971).
9. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to insti-
"10tute new government....
True, the disorder itself may become unjust, if it involves
indiscriminate violence against people, as did the Cultural
Revolution in China in the period 1966-76, which started out
with the aim of equality, but eventually became vengeful and
murderous. But that danger should not lead us back to the old
injustices in order to have stability. It should only lead us to
seek methods of achieving justice which, while disorderly and
upsetting, avoid massive violence to human rights.
The answer to worries about disobedience to law leading
to "anarchy" is best given by historical experience. Did the
mass demonstrations of the black movement in the American
South in the early Sixties lead to "anarchy?" True, they dis-
rupted the order of racial segregation. They created scenes of
disorder in hundreds of towns and cities in the country
(although it might be argued that the police, responding to
non-violent protest, were the chief creators of that disorder).
But the result of all that tumult was not general lawlessness."
Rather, the result was a healthy reconstitution, of the social
order towards greaterjustice, and a healthy new understanding
among Americans (not all, of course) about the need for racial
equality.
The orthodox notion is that law and order are inseparable.
However, absolute obedience to law not only violates justice,
but leads to disorder. Hitler, calling for law and order, threw
Europe into the hellish disorder of war. Every nation uses the
power of law to keep its population obedient, to mobilize
acquiescent armies, threatening punishment for those who
refuse. Thus, the creation of order inside each nation by law,
leads to the unspeakable disorder of war, to the bloody chaos
of the battlefield, to international "anarchy." (I use quotation
marks because the philosophy of anarchism does not envision
or approve of widespread disorder, but rather foresees a volun-
tary harmony that would come in a just, egalitarian society.)
If law and order are only ways of making injustice legiti-
mate, then the "order" on the surface of everyday life may con-
ceal deep mental and emotional disorder among the victims of
injustice. This is also true for the powerful beneficiaries of the
system, in the way that slavery distorted the psyches of both
10. Id.
11. See M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS 17 (1970) (noting that "there is very
little evidence which suggests that carefully limited, morally serious civil
disobedience undermines the legal system or endangers physical security").
1991)
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slaves and masters. In such a case, the order will only be tem-
porary, and when it is broken, it may be accompanied by a
bloodbath of disorder-as in the United States, when the
tightly-controlled order of slavery ended in civil war, and
600,000 men died in a country of 35 million people.
THE MODERN ERA OF LAW
We take much pride in that phrase of John Adams, second
President of the United States, when he spoke of the "rule of
law" replacing the "rule of men." The test of justification for
an act is not its legality but its morality. The idea is that in
ancient societies, in feudal society, there were no clear rules,
written in statute books, accompanied by constitutions, and so
everyone was subject to the whims of powerful men, whether
the feudal lord or the tribal chief, or the king.
But, the story goes, modem times, bringing big cities,
international trade, widespread literacy, and parliamentary
government, also brought the rule of law, no longer personal
and arbitrary, but written down, impersonal, neutral, applying
equally to all, and therefore democratic.
And so there is much reverence for certain symbols of the
modem "rule of law": the Magna Carta, which stated what are
men's rights against the king; the American Constitution, which
is supposed to limit the powers of government and provide a
Bill of Rights; the Napoleonic Code, which introduced uni-
formity into the French legal system. But we might get uneasy
about the connection between law and democracy when we
read the comment of two historians (Robert Palmer and Joel
Colton, A History of the Modern World) on Napoleon: "Man on
horseback though he was, he believed firmly in the rule of law."
I don't want to deny the benefits of the modern era: the
advance of science, the improvements in health, the spread of
literacy and art beyond tiny elites, the value of even an imper-
fect representative system over a monarchy. But those advan-
tages lead us to overlook the fact that the modern era,
replacing the arbitrary rule of men with the impartial rule of
law, has not brought any fundamental change in the facts of
unequal wealth and unequal power. What was done before-
exploiting the poor, sending the young to war, putting trouble-
some people in dungeons-is still done, except that this no
longer seems to be the arbitrary action of the feudal lord or the
king; it now has the authority of neutral, impersonal law.
The law appears impersonal. It is on paper, and who can
trace it back to what men? And because it has the look of neu-
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trality, its injustices are made legitimate. It was not easy to
hold onto the "divine right" of kings-everyone could see that
the king was a man (or the queen a woman), or whether the
emperor had clothes or was naked. A code of law is more easily
deified than a flesh-and-blood ruler.
Under the rule of men, the oppressor was identifiable, and
so peasant rebels hunted down the lords, slaves killed planta-
tion owners, and revolutionaries assassinated monarchs. In the
era of corporate bureaucracies, representative assemblies, and
the rule of law, the enemy is elusive, unidentifiable. In John
Steinbeck's depression-era novel, The Grapes of Wrath, a farmer
having his land taken away from him confronts the tractor
driver who is knocking down his house. He aims a gun at him,
but is confused when the driver tells him that he takes his
orders from a banker in Oklahoma City, who takes his orders
from a banker in New York. The farmer cries out: "Who can
we shoot?"' 2
The rule of law does not do away with the unequal distri-
bution of wealth and power. It reinforces that inequality with
the authority of law. It allocates wealth and poverty (through
taxes and appropriations) but it does this in such complicated
and indirect ways as to leave the observer bewildered; you can
try to trace back from cause to cause and you will die of old age
before you can figure it out.
What was obvious exploitation when the peasant gave half
his produce to the lord is now the product of a complex market
society enforced by a library of statutes. A mine owner in
Appalachia was asked, some years ago, by a curious young man,
why the coal companies paid so little taxes, and kept so much
of the wealth from the coal fields, while local people starved.
The owner replied: "I pay exactly what the law asks me to
pay."9
There is a huge interest in the United-States in crime and
corruption as ways of acquiring wealth. But the greatest
wealth, the largest fortunes, are acquired legally, aided by the
laws of contract and property, enforced in the courts by
friendly judges, handled by shrewd corporation lawyers, fig-
ured out by well-paid accountants. Our history books, when
they get to the 1920s, dwell on the Teapot Dome scandals of
the Harding Administration, while ignoring the far greater
reallocations of wealth that took place legally, through the tax
laws proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon (a
12. J. STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 52 (Viking Compass ed.
1958).
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very rich man, through oil and aluminum), and passed by Con-
gress in the Coolidge Administration.
How can this be? Didn't the modem era bring us democ-
racy? Who drew up the Constitution? Wasn't it all of us, get-
ting together to draw up the rules by which we would live, a
"social contract?" Doesn't the Preamble to the Constitution
start with the words "We the People, in order to ... etc. etc."?
In fact, while the Constitution was certainly an improve-
ment over the crown colonies controlled by the King of Eng-
land, or the proprietary colonies, openly controlled by wealthy
landowners, it was still a document drawn up by rich men,
merchants and slaveowners, who wanted a bit of political
democracy, but had no sympathy for economic democracy. It
was designed to set up a "rule of law" which would efficiently
prevent rebellion by dissatisfied elements in the population. As
the Founding Fathers assembled in Philadelphia, they still had
in mind farmers who had recently taken up arms in western
Massachusetts against unjust treatment by the wealth-con-
trolled legislature.'"
It is certainly a deception of the citizenry to claim that the
"rule of law" has replaced the "rule of men." True, we have all
these laws. But it is still men (women are mostly still kept out
of the process) who pass these laws, who sit on the bench and
interpret them, who occupy the White House or the Gover-
nor's mansion, and have the job of enforcing them.
These men have enormous powers of discretion. The leg-
islators can decide which laws to put on the books. The presi-
dent and his Attorney-general can decide which laws to
enforce. The judges can decide who has a right to sue in court,
what instructions to give to juries, what rules of law to apply
and what evidence should not be allowed in the courtroom.
As for lawyers, to whom ordinary people must turn for
help in making their way through the court system, they are
trained and selected in such a way as to insure their conserva-
tism. The exceptions, when they appear, are noble and wel-
come, but too many lawyers are more concerned about being
"good professionals" than achieving justice. As one student of
the world of lawyers put it: "It is of the essence of the profes-
13. The distinguished historian Charles Beard, in C. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913), broke through the romanticization of the Founding Fathers with his
exploration of their economic interests and their political ideas. Other
scholars have claimed to refute him, but I believe his fundamental thesis
remains untouched: wealth and political power are inextricably related.
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sionalization process to divorce law from politics, to elevate
technique and craft over power, to search for 'neutral princi-
ples,' and to deny ideological purpose."' 4
"Equal Justice Under Law" is the slogan one sees on the
marble pillars of the courthouse. And there is nothing in the
words of the Constitution or the laws to indicate that anyone
gets special treatment. They look as if they apply to everyone.
But in the actual administration of the laws, are rich and poor
treated equally? Blacks and whites? Foreign born and natives?
Conservatives and radicals? Private citizens and government
officials?
There is a mountain of evidence on this: a CIA official
(Richard Helms) who commits perjury gets off with a fine 5
(Alger Hiss spent four years in jail for perjury;) 6 a President
(Nixon) is pardoned in advance of prosecution for acts against
the law.' 7 Or note this news item:
The government, saying it could not go to trial with-
out exposing CIA secrets, yesterday dropped its perjury
case against an ITT [International Telephone and Tele-
graph] vice president accused of concealing the com-
pany's efforts to influence Chile's 1970 election. 8
Still, the system of laws, in order to maintain its standing in
the eyes of the citizenry, to keep up the appearance of fairness,
to provide safety valves by which the discontented can let off
steam and thus keep the system safe and stable, must have a bit
of fairness.
And so, the law itself provides for change. When the pres-
sure of discontent becomes great, laws are passed to satisfy
some part of the grievance. Presidents, when pushed by social
movements, may enforce good laws. Judges, observing a
changing temper in the society, may come forth with humane
decisions.
Thus, we have alternating currents of progress and paraly-
sis. Periods of war alternate with periods of peace. There are
times of witch-hunts for dissenters, and times of apologies for
the witch-hunts. We have "conservative" presidents giving way
14. SeeJ. AUERBACH'S UNEQUALJUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) for an excellent critique of the legal profession
by a historian.
15. See Helms Is Fined $2000 and Given Two-Year Suspended Prison Term,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1977, at AI, col. 2.
16. SeeJ. SMITH, ALGER Hiss: THE TRUE STORY 432 (1976).
17. See G. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 176-78 (1979).
18. UPI dispatch, March 8, 1979 (on file with the author).
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to liberal presidents and back again. The Supreme Court
makes decisions one week on behalf of civil liberties, and the
next week curtails them. No one can get a clear fix on the sys-
tem that way.
The modern system of the rule of law is something like
roulette. Sometimes you win and sometimes you lose. No one
can predict in any one instance whether the little ball will fall
into the red or the black, and no one is really responsible. You
win, you lose. But as in roulette, in the end you almost always
lose. The results are fixed, not by corruption, but by the legiti-
mate rules of the game. In roulette, the results are fixed by the
structure of the wheel, the laws of mathematical probability,
the rules of "the house." In society the results are fixed by the
law of contract, the rules of the market, and the power of the
authorities to change the rules or violate them at will.
What is the structure of society's roulette wheel that
insures you will, in the end, lose? It is, first of all, the great
disparities in wealth, which give a tremendous advantage to
those who can buy and sell industries, buy and sell people's
labor and services, buy and sell the means of communication,
subsidize the educational system, buy and sell the political can-
didates themselves. Second, the structure of "checks and bal-
ances," in which bold new reforms can be buried in committee,
vetoed by one legislative chamber, or by the President, inter-
preted to death by the Supreme Court, or unenforced if passed
by Congress.
In this system, the occasional victories may ease some of
the pain of economic injustice. They also reveal the usefulness
of protest and pressure, and suggest even greater possibilities
for the future. And they keep you in the game, giving you the
feeling of fairness, preventing you from getting angry and
upsetting the wheel. It is a system ingeniously devised for
maintaining things as they are, while allowing only for limited
reform.
OBLIGATION TO THE STATE
Despite all I have said about the gap between law and jus-
tice, and despite the fact that this gap is visible to many people
in the society, the idea of obligation to law, obligation to gov-
ernment, remains powerful. When in 1979, President Jimmy
Carter reinstated the draft of young men for military service,
and television reporters interviewed those who went to regis-
ter, asking them why they were complying with the law (per-
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haps 10% were not), the most common answer was: "I owe it
to my country."
The obligation that people feel to one another goes back
to the very beginning of human history, as a natural, spontane-
ous act in human relations. 9 Obligation to government, how-
ever, is not natural. It must be taught to every generation.
And who can teach this lesson of obligation with more author-
ity than the great Plato? For a long time now, Plato has been
one of the gods of modern culture, his reputation that of an
awesome mind, a brilliant writer of dialogue, his work the
greatest of the Great Books. You don't criticize Plato without a
risk of being called anti-intellectual, of being drummed out of
the circle of educated people.
Plato, shrewdly, puts his ideas about obligation in the
mouth of Socrates.2" Socrates left no writings that we know of,
so he can be used to say whatever Plato wants. And Plato could
have no better spokesman than a wise, gentle old man who was
put to death by the government of Athens in 399 B.C. for
speaking his mind. Any words coming from such a man will be
especially persuasive.
But they are Plato's words, Plato's ideas. All we know of
Socrates is what Plato tells us. Or, what we read in the recollec-
tions of another contemporary, Xenophon. Or, what we can
believe about him from reading Aristophanes' spoof on his
friend Socrates, in his play, The Clouds.
So we can't know for sure what Socrates really said to his
friend Crito, who visited him in jail, after he had been con-
demned to death. But we do know that what Plato has him say,
in the dialogue Crito (written many years after Socrates' execu-
tion) has been impressed on the minds of many, many genera-
tions, down to the present day, with deadly effect.
It really doesn't matter if most Americans have never read
anything by Plato; his ideas have become part of the orthodoxy
of the nation, absorbed into the national bloodstream, repro-
duced in ordinary conversations and on bumper stickers.
("Love it or leave it"-summing up Plato's idea of obligation.)
19. The political theorist Michael Walzer writes about "the obligation
to disobey." He talks about people having the "obligation to honor the
engagements they have explicitly made, to defend the groups and uphold the
ideas to which they have committed themselves, even against the state, so
long as their disobedience of laws or legally authorized commands does not
threaten the very existence of the larger society or endanger the lives of its
citizens. Sometimes it is obedience to the state, when one has a duty to
disobey, that must be justified." M. WALZER, supra note 11, at 16-17.
20. PLATO, EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRIrO (F. Church trans. 1948).
1991]
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Plato's message is presented appealingly by a man calmly
facing death, whose courage disarms any possible skepticism.
It is made even more appealing by the fact that it follows
another dialogue, the Apology, in which (according to Plato),
Socrates addresses the jury in an eloquent defense of free
speech, saying those famous words: "[The] unexamined life is
not worth living."21
Plato then unashamedly (lesson one in intellectual bully-
ing: speak with utter confidence) presents us with some unex-
amined ideas. Having established Socrates' credentials as a
martyr for independent thought, he proceeds in the Crito to put
on Socrates' tongue an argument for blind obedience to
government.
It is hardly a dialogue, though Plato is famous for dia-
logue, and the famous "Socratic method" is based on teaching
through dialogue. Poor Crito, who visits Socrates in prison to
persuade him to let his friends plan his escape, is virtually
tongue-tied. He is reduced to saying, to every one of Socrates'
little speeches: "Yes . . .of course . . .clearly . . .I agree ...
Yes ... I think that you are right... True ... ."" And Socrates
is going on and on, like the good trouper that he is, saying
Plato's lines, making Plato's argument. We know the ideas are
Plato's because in his famous, much bigger dialogue, the Repub-
lic, he makes an even more extended case for a totalitarian
state.
To Crito's offer of escape, Socrates replies: No, I must
obey the law . . . true, Athens has committed an injustice
against me by ordering me to die for speaking my mind [Such a
mild reaction! They have ordered him put to death and he is
somewhat annoyed.] . . .but if I complained about this injus-
tice, Athens could rightly say: "We brought you into the world,
we raised you, we educated you, we gave you and every other
citizen a share of all the good things we could.""3
Socrates accepts this argument of the state. He tells Crito
that by not leaving Athens he agreed to obey its laws. So he
must go to his death. Yes, it is Plato's own bumper-sticker:
"Love it or leave it."
Plato was the apostle of civil obedience. If he had lived
another two thousand years or so he would have encountered
the argument of Henry David Thoreau, the quiet hermit of
Walden Pond, who wrote a famous essay on civil disobedience.
21. Id. at 45.
22. Id. at 55-56.
23. Id. at 61.
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Thoreau said that whatever good things we have were not
given us by the state, but by the energies and talents of the
people of the country. And he would be damned if he would
pay taxes to support a war against Mexico based on such a pal-
try argument.
Plato, the Western world's star intellectual, makes a
number of paltry arguments in this so-called dialogue. He has
Socrates imagining the authorities addressing him: "What"
complaint have you against us and the state, that you are trying
to destroy us? Are we not, first of all, your parents? Through
us your father took your mother and brought you into the
world."24
What complaint? Only that they are putting him to death!
The state as parents? Now we understand those words: The
Motherland, or the Fatherland, or the Founding Fathers, or
Uncle Sam. What neat spades for planting the idea of obliga-
tion. So, it's not some little junta of military men and politi-
cians who are sending you to die in some muddy field in Asia or
Central America; it's your mother, your father, or your father's
favorite brother. How can you say no?
"Through us your father took your mother and brought
you into the world." What stately arrogance! To give the state
credit for marriage and children, as if without government men
and women would remain apart and celibate.
Socrates listens meekly to the words of the Law:
[Are] you too wise to see that your country is worthier,
more to be revered, more sacred, and held in higher
honor both by the gods and by all men of understanding,
than your father and your mother and all your other
ancestors; and that you ought to reverence it, and to sub-
mit to it .... and to obey in silence if it orders you to
endure flogging or imprisonment, or if it sends you to
battle to be wounded or to die?25
In the face of this heartfelt argument, Crito is virtually
mute, a sad sack of a debater. You would think that Plato, just
to maintain his reputation for good dialogue, would give Crito
some better lines. But he took no chances.
Plato says (again, through Socrates bullying Crito): "In
war, and in the court of justice, and everywhere, you must do
whatever your state and your country tell you to do, or you
must persuade them that their commands are unjust."26
24. Id. at 60.
25. Id. at 60-61.
26. Id. at 61.
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Why not insist that the state persuade us to do its bidding?
There is no equality in Plato's scheme: the citizen may use per-
suasion, no more; the state may use force.
And so it is that the admirable obligation human beings
feel to one's neighbors, one's loved ones, even to a stranger
needing water or shelter, becomes confused with blind obedi-
ence to that deadly artifact called government. And in that
confusion, young men, going off to war in some part of the
world they never heard of, for some cause that cannot be
rationally explained, then say: "I owe it to my country."
It seems that the idea of owing, of obligation, is strongly
felt by almost everyone. But what does one owe the govern-
ment? Granted, the government may do useful things for its
citizens: help farmers, administer old-age pensions and health
benefits, regulate the use of drugs, apprehend criminals, etc.
But, because the government administers these programs (for
which the citizens pay taxes, and for which the government offi-
cials draw salaries), does this mean that you owe the govern-
ment your life?
A confusion of the country for the government. That is what
the Declaration of Independence tried to make clear, that the
people of the country set up the government, to achieve the
aims of equality and justice, and when a government no longer
pursues those aims it loses its legitimacy, it has violated its obli-
gation to the citizens, and deserves no more respect or obedi-
ence. It is very clever of the government to pose as the
country, to get people to say: "I owe something to my coun-
try" and then proceed to obey the government, to which they
owe nothing when it has taken away their human rights, when it
threatens their lives, when it becomes their enemy.
We are intimidated by the word "patriotism," afraid to be
called unpatriotic. Early in the 20th century, the Russian-
American anarchist and feminist, Emma Goldman, lectured on
Patriotism. She said:
,.. conceit, arrogance and egotism are the essentials
of patriotism .... Patriotism assumes that our globe is
divided into little spots, each one surrounded by an iron
gate. Those who had the fortune of being born on some
particular spot, consider themselves better, nobler,
grander, more intelligent than the living beings inhab-
iting any other spot. It is, therefore, the duty of everyone
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living on that chosen spot to fight, kill, and die in the
attempt to impose his superiority upon all the others."2 7
Even the symbols of patriotism-the flag, the national
anthem-become objects of worship, and those who refuse to
worship are treated as heretics. When, in 1989, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that a citizen has a right to express
himself-herself by burning the American flag, there was an
uproar in the White House and in Congress. President Bush,
almost in tears, began speaking of a constitutional amendment
to make flag-burning a crime. Congress, with its customary
sheepishness, rushed to pass a law providing a year in prison
for anyone hurting the flag.
The humorist Garrison Keillor responded to the President
with some seriousness:
Flag-burning is a minor insult compared to.George
Bush's cynical use of the flag for political advantage. Any
decent law to protect the flag ought to prohibit politi-
cians from wrapping it around themselvesl Flag-burning
is an impulsive act by a powerless individual-but the
cool pinstripe demagoguery of this powerful preppie is a
real and present threat to freedom.
28
If patriotism were defined, not as blind obedience to gov-
ernment, not as submissive worship to flags and anthems, but
rather as love of one's country, one's fellow citizens (all over
the world), as loyalty to the principles ofjustice and democracy,
then patriotism would require us to disobey our government,
when it violated those principles.
It is curious that Socrates (according to Plato) was willing
to disobey the authorities by preaching as he chose, by telling
the young what he saw as the truth, even if that meant going
against the laws of Athens. Yet, when he was sentenced to
death, and by a divided jury (the vote was 281 to 220), he
meekly accepted the verdict, saying he owed Athens obedience
to its laws, giving that puny 56% majority vote an absolute
right to take his life.
ACCEPT YOUR PUNISHMENT!
Socrates' position has become one of the cardinal princi-
ples in the liberal philosophy of civil disobedience, and part of
the dominant American orthodoxy in the United States, for
conservatives and liberals both. It is usually stated this way:
27. E. GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 128-29 (1969).
28. Keillor, Toasting the Flag, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1989, § 4, at 13.
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it's your right to break the law when your conscience is
offended; but then you must accept your punishment.
29
Why? Why agree to be punished when you think you have
acted rightly and the law, punishing you for that, has acted
wrongly? Why is it all right to disobey the law in the first
instance, but then, when you are sentenced to prison, start
obeying it?3
0
Some people, to support the idea of accepting punish-
ment, like to quote Martin Luther King, Jr., whose opinions
29. Carl Cohen, for instance, in his book CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW (1971) makes a distinction between
"direct disobedience" (disobeying a law which is in itself wrong, like a law
drafting you into military service), in which case evading punishment is
justified, and "indirect disobedience," where someone is violating something
like a trespassing law which is not in itself bad, in which case "it is right for
him to be punished." Id. at 52. That distinction makes no sense to me,
because while the trespass law may be theoretically. okay, if it is applied
unjustly against a political protester, the punishment for disobeying it is also
unjust.
The philosopher Sidney Hook, once a radical, later a supporter of
American foreign policy in Vietnam and other military interventions, dealt
with this question in his book THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM (1962). He says a
democrat (his emphasis) can defend an unlawful action "only [his emphasis] if
he willingly accepts the punishment entailed by his defiance of the law."
Otherwise, Hook says, "he has in principle embarked upon a policy of
revolutionary overthrow." This seems silly to me. Sure, a person who evades
prison may be a revolutionary, but he also may not. Angela Davis was a
Communist, and presumably a revolutionary. Daniel Berrigan was bitterly
opposed to the war, but hardly "embarked upon a policy of revolutionary
overthrow." Both evaded prison.
30. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, in his book TAKING RIGrs
SERIOUSLY (1978), argues that people should not be punished when
committing civil disobedience when "the law is uncertain, in the sense that a
plausible case can be made on both sides." Id. at 212. And, he claims, any
moral issue can find a plausible basis in the Constitution, even if the Supreme
Court has not yet come to that conclusion. He seems to be straining to find a
legal basis for civil disobedience, as if the morality of the disobedient act is not
enough. Granted, the Constitution has enough open-ended rights (the Ninth
Amendment, for instance, has endless possibilities for asserting the rights of
people) to cover just about anything. But to seek refuge in that gives too
much support to the idea that you must have a legal cover for your moral act.
Dworkin's undue respect for the law shows itself when he says (near the end
of his chapter on "Civil Disobedience"): "If acts of dissent continue to occur
after the Supreme Court has ruled that the laws are valid, or that the political
question doctrine applies, then acquittal on the grounds I have described [an
"uncertain' law] is no longer appropriate." Id. at 222. In other words,
Dworkin is willing to accept punishment-he suggests "minimal or
suspended sentences"-for insistent civil disobedience. Dworkin finds
himself in the humble position of appealing for leniency to the authorities-
to Congress, to the prosecutor, to the judge-because he is constantly
addressing, not the citizenry, but the government (the prince).
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deserve respect because he is one of the great apostles of civil
disobedience in this century. He once wrote:
I submit that an individual who breaks a law that
conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the
penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the
community over its injustices is in reality expressing the
very highest respect for law.3 '
I believe this passage has too often been misinterpreted. It
is part of King's famous "Letter from Birmingham City Jail,"
written in the spring of 1963, in the midst of tumultuous dem-
onstrations in Birmingham against racial segregation. A group
of white Alabama church leaders wrote to King asking that he
stop the demonstrations: "When rights are consistently
denied, a cause should be pressed in the courts and in negotia-
tions among local leaders, and not in the streets. '32 King's
reply was an impassioned defense of non-violent direct action,
but it is obvious that he was trying his best to persuade these
conservative church leaders of his moderation, and so was anx-
ious to show that, while committing civil disobedience, he was
"expressing the very highest respect for law."
But the "law" that King respected, we know unquestiona-
bly from his life, his work, his philosophy, was not man-made
law, neither segregation laws, nor even laws approved by the
Supreme Court, nor decisions of the courts, nor sentences
meted out by judges. He meant respect for "the higher law,"
the law of morality, of justice.
To be "one who willingly accepts" punishment, is not the
same as thinking it right to be punished for an act of conscience.
If this were so, why would King agree to be released from jail
by behind-the-scenes pressure, as he did in 1960 when a myste-
rious benefactor in a high position (someone close to Presi-
dent-elect Kennedy) pulled strings to get him out of prison?
The meaning of "willingly accepts" is that you know you are
risking jail, and are willing to take that risk, but it doesn't mean
it is morally right for you to be punished.
In the quoted passage King talks about "staying in jail to
arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice." He
does not speak of staying in jail because he owes that to the gov-
ernment, and that (as Plato argues) he has a duty to obey
whatever the government tells him to do. Not at all. The stay-
31. King, Letter froma Birmingham City Jail, reprinted in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
78-79 (H. Bedau ed. 1969).
32. Quoted in NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 461
(S. Lynd ed. 1966).
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ing in jail is not for philosophical or moral reasons, but for a
practical purpose, to continue his struggle in a different way,
"to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice."
In King's situation, where a world-famous figure spends a
limited time in jail, the cost to his freedom and his ability to
organize is relatively small, but the gain from the publicity and
attention, and aroused indignation is very great. So the practi-
cal use of "accepting" punishment is obvious.
But we can safely say, knowing King's life and thought,
that if the circumstances were different, he might well have
agreed (unlike Socrates) to escape from jail. What if he had
been sentenced, not to six months in a Georgia prison, but to
death? Would he have "accepted" this?
Would King have condemned those black slaves who were
tried under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and ordered to
return to slavery, and refused to give themselves up, who ran
away from their sentence? Would he have criticized Angela
Davis, the black militant who, after she had participated in a
daring rescue of a black prisoner from a courtroom, refused to
stand trial and went underground?
We can imagine another test of King's attitude towards
"accepting" punishment. During the Vietnam war, which King
powerfully opposed ("The long night of war must be stopped,"
he said in 1965), the Catholic priest-poet Daniel Berrigan com-
mitted an act of civil disobedience. He and other men and
women of the "Catonsville Nine" entered a draft board in
Catonsville, Maryland, removed draft records, and set them
afire in a public "ceremony."
Father Berrigan delivered a Meditation:
Our apologies, good friends, for the fracture of good
order, the burning of paper instead of children .... We
could not, so help us God, do otherwise .... We say:
killing is disorder, life and gentleness and community
and unselfishness is the only order we recognize. For the
sake of that order we risk our liberty, our good name.
The time is past when good men can remain silent, when
obedience can segregate men from public risk, when the
poor can die without defense.
3
While he used the term "men," one of the Catonsville
Nine was a woman, Mary Moylan. When they were all found
guilty and sentenced to jail terms, and lost their appeals,
33. Quoted in H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 479
(1980).
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she and Daniel Berrigan refused to turn themselves in,
remained "underground." Berrigan was found after four
months, Mary Moylan was never apprehended. She wrote from
underground: "I don't want to see people marching off to jail
with smiles on their faces. I just don't want them going .... I
don't want to waste the sisters and brothers we have by march-
ing them off to jail .. .
Berrigan and Moylan thought the war was wrong, thought
their going to jail for opposing it was wrong. If, like King, they
felt it would serve some practical use, they probably would
have "accepted it." Going to jail can make a certain kind of
statement to the public: "Yes, I feel so strongly about what is
happening in the world that I am willing to risk jail to express
my feelings."
Refusing to go to jail makes a different kind of statement:
"The system that sentenced me is the same foul system that is
carrying on this war. I will defy it to the end. It does not
deserve my allegiance." As Daniel Berrigan said: yes, we will
respect the order of "gentleness and community" but not the
"order" of making war on children.
Daniel Berrigan and I had traveled together in early 1968
to Hanoi to pick up three American pilots released from prison
by the North Vietnamese. We became good friends, and I was
soon in close contact with the extraordinary Catholic resistance
movement against the Vietnam war. It was in early 1970, his
last appeal turned down, facing several years in prison, that he
"disappeared," sending the F.B.I. into a frantic effort to find
him. They had caught sight of him at a huge student rally in
the Cornell University gymnasium, but before they could make
their way through the crowd the lights went out, and when they
came on he was gone, spirited away inside a huge puppet, to a
nearby farm house.
A few days after his disappearance, I received a phone call
at my home in Boston. It was from New York City, and I was
being invited to speak at a Catholic church on the upper West
Side Manhattan, on the issue of the war and the Berrigans.
Philip Berrigan, Daniel's brother, also a priest, also one of the
Catonsville Nine, also gone underground, had just been found
by the FBI in the tiny apartment of the church's pastor.
The church was packed with perhaps five hundred people.
FBI agents mingled with the crowd, alerted that Daniel Berri-
gan might show up suddenly, as he had at Cornell. (Someone
later claimed one hundred FBI agents were there, but this is
34. Quoted in id, at 480.
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hard to believe, even of the FBI.) I made a brief speech.
Another friend of Dan Berrigan spoke. This was Eqbal Ahmad,
a Pakistani intellectual and one of the anti-war movement's
most eloquent speakers.
As the two of us sat on the platform, listening to more
speeches, a note was passed to us, to meet two nuns at a Span-
ish-Chinese restaurant farther up Broadway, near Columbia
University. At this restaurant, we were given directions to New
Jersey, to the house where Dan Berrigan was hiding out.
The next morning we rented a car, drove to New Jersey,
and met him. The house he was staying in was not secure (in
fact, an FBI agent lived across the street!). We arranged a trip
to Boston, a car, a driver, a destination. From that point on, for
the next four months, he eluded and exasperated the FBI, stay-
ing underground, but surfacing from time to time, to deliver a
sermon at a church in Philadelphia, to be interviewed on
national television, to make public statements about the war, to
make a film (The Holy Outlaw) about his actions against the war,
both overt and underground.
During those four months I was helping take care of Berri-
gan, and also teaching my course at Boston University in polit-
ical theory. I was discussing Socrates' reasons for not escaping
punishment, and asking my students to listen to his reasons,
and also to consider Daniel Berrigan's reasons for going
Underground. They did not know, of course, that Berrigan was
right there in Boston, living out his ideas.
I think it is a good guess, despite those often-quoted words
of his on "accepting" punishment, that Martin Luther King, Jr.
would have supported Berrigan's actions, as he would have
supported Angela Davis' escape from punishment, as he would
have applauded the refusal of black slaves before the Civil War
to give themselves up to the punishment of the Fugitive Slave
Law. The principle is clear. If it is right to disobey unjust laws,
it is right to disobey unjust punishment for breaking those laws.
The idea behind "accept your punishment" (advanced
often by "liberals" sympathetic with dissent) is that whatever
your disagreement with some specific law or some particular
policy, you should not spread disrespect for the law in general,
because we need respect for the law in order to keep society
intact.3 5
35. John Rawls, in his book A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), has a section
on civil disobedience (pp. 363-391) in which he worries about civil
disobedience going so far as to bring about a general disrespect for law, but
he does speak strongly (see id. at 390-91) about the obligation to resist under
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This is like saying: since apples are good for children, we
must insist that they not refuse the rotten ones, because that
might lead them to reject all apples. Well, good apples are
good for your health, and rotten apples are bad. Bad laws and
bad policies endanger our lives, our freedoms. Why can't we
trust human intelligence to make the proper distinctions-
among laws as among apples?
The domino theory is in people's minds: let one domino
fall and they will all go. It is a psychology of absolute control,
in which the need for total security brings an end to freedom.
Let anyone evade punishment, and the whole social structure
will come down. Socrates scolds Crito: "Do you think that a
state can exist and not be overthrown in which the decisions
are of no force and are disregarded and undermined by private
individuals?"
We might respond: can a decent society exist (that is our
concern, not the state), if people humbly obey all laws, even
those that violate human rights? And when unjust laws, unjust
policies become the rule, should not the state (in Plato's words)
"be overthrown?"
Jefferson and the Declaration were clear on this: "But
when a long train of abuses & usurpations pursuing invariably
the same object evinces a design to reduce them under abso-
lute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such
government .... 6
Most people quickly accept the idea of disobedience in a
totalitarian society, or in a blatantly undemocratic situation as
in the American south with its racial segregation. But they look
differently on breaking the law in a liberal society, where par-
ties compete for the voice of citizens, and laws are passed by
bodies of elected representatives, and people have opportuni-
ties for free expression of their ideas.3 7
certain circumstances. Rawis, however, confines his discussion to the
situation in a "nearly just society," by which he seems to mean the United
States. This exaggerates the justness in our system and therefore creates a
basis for a more cautious and partial acceptance of civil disobedience. For an
excellent comparison of the views on civil disobedience of Rawls, Dworkin,
and myself, see Karapin, The State, Democracy, and the Disobedient Citizen: A
Review of Some Recent North American Contributions (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author) (written as part of the author's National Science
Foundation Graduate Fellowship).
36. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
37. Liberals and conservatives often join on this issue. For instance,
Irving Kristol, a leading American conservative, wrote during the Vietnam
war:
Even were I opposed to the Administration's policy in Vietnam,
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What this argument misses is that civil disobedience gives
an intensity to expression, by its dramatic violation of law, which
other means-voting, speaking, writing-do not possess. And
if we are to avoid majority tyranny over oppressed minorities,
we must give a dissident minority a way of expressing the full-
ness of its grievance.
What kind of person can we admire, can we ask young peo-
ple of the next generation to emulate-the strict follower of
law, or the dissident who struggles, sometimes within, some-
times outside, sometimes against the law, but always for jus-
tice? What life is best worth living, the life of the proper,
obedient, dutiful follower of law and order, or the life of the
independent thinker, the rebel?
Leo Tolstoy, in his story "The Death of Ivan Ilyich" tells of
a proper, successful magistrate, who on his deathbed wonders
why he suddenly feels that his life has been horrible and sense-
less. "Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done .... But
how could that be, when I did everything properly?' . . and he
remembered all the legality, correctitude and propriety of his
life." 38
which I am not, I would not regard this case as one in which civil
disobedience is justified. The opportunities for dissent are
obviously abundant.
Kristol, Civil Disobedience Is Not Justified By Vietnam, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov.
26, 1967, at 129, reprinted in H. Bedau, supra note 31, at 209.
What Kristol misses is that citizens may have the opportunity to speak
up, but speaking alone may not be effective enough, powerful enough, to get
a nation out of a war.
38. L. TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH 148 (A. Maude trans. 1960).
